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8.1  Introduction and Summary 
Stabilization programs in developing countries generally have three 
components: a reduction in government spending, devaluation, and a 
slowdown in  money  growth.  If  prices  and  wages  are not  perfectly 
flexible, the cut in government spending will produce a recession in 
the short run.  With imported intermediate goods in the picture, the 
devaluation will generate stagflation; the price level will rise and value 
added will be squeezed. Both of these components of the program will 
squeeze profits, and the increase in the price of imported capital goods 
will raise the cost of  capital. These additive effects will  reduce  in- 
vestment and future growth. The purposes of this paper are to specify 
and analyze a model that describes these effects; to provide an illus- 
tration of the model by using data on Kenya; and to suggest how the 
stabilization  program  can  be  designed  to  minimize  the  effects  on 
investment. 
In section 8.2 the basic model is specified and analyzed. I focus on 
a stylized structure of  an economy with two sectors. One produces an 
agricultural output that is exported and not consumed domestically. 
This is essentially the case in Kenya, where nearly  all of  the major 
export crops-coffee,  tea, and sisal-and  polyurethane are exported. 
I assume that output elasticity in this sector is low. The other sector 
produces a nontraded domestic good using domestic factors and an 
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imported intermediate input, all of which have a low elasticity of sub- 
stitution among them. A large fraction of  capital goods are also im- 
ported, again consistent with the case of Kenya. The country is small 
in its export and import markets. The degree of wage indexation to the 
consumer price index (CPI) is introduced as a parameter. Section 8.2 
goes on to show the effects of a stabilization program on prices, output, 
inputs, and profits in the nontraded sector and on the trade balance in 
terms of foreign exchange. Numerical results using Kenyan data are 
presented in table 8.3. The potential stagflationary effects of a deval- 
uation are an extension of arguments presented in Branson (1983) and 
Katseli (1983), which in turn were extensions of the earlier results of 
Cooper (1971) and Krugman and Taylor (1978). 
The effects of a stabilization program on investment incentives are 
discussed in section 8.3. The analysis focuses on the effect on Tobin’s 
q-ratio, the ratio of the market value of assets to their replacement 
cost. These effects are summarized with numerical estimates from the 
Kenyan data. This section also compares the effects of a devaluation 
and a cut in government spending that yield the same result for the 
trade balance. The results are shown in table 8.4. The spending cut 
reduces employment somewhat more than the devaluation does, but 
has a significantly smaller effect on real profits and the relative price 
of capital goods and thus on investment incentives. The differences 
between the two alternatives decrease with an increase in the degree 
of wage indexation. The devaluation is, of course, inflationary, whereas 
the spending cut is deflationary. 
The results in table 8.4 strongly suggest that a country in a situation 
comparable to Kenya’s in  1979-80  should meet an external shock to 
the terms of trade by directly reducing absorption rather than by de- 
valuation. With low levels of wage indexation, the spending cut will 
have a much  smaller effect  on investment incentives and avoid the 
inflationary consequences of devaluation, which in turn will allow the 
country to maintain nonindexed of wages. The cost of  this program 
will be a small additional reduction in  employment  in  the domestic 
goods sector. 
In section 8.4 I turn briefly to a more general discussion of the role 
of devaluation. In an economy with this structure, which may still be 
typical of the African countries, a devaluation may increase the current 
deficit in  terms of  domestic prices, even if  it improves the deficit in 
terms of foreign exchange. Thus, a combination of devaluation and a 
cut in government spending can be doubly recessionary, and deval- 
uation may not be an appropriate component of a policy program de- 
signed to meet an external shock such as the terms-of-trade deterio- 
ration in  Kenya in  1979-80.  On the other hand, devaluation is  an 
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that follows a protracted disequilibrium characterized by domestic in- 
flation with a fixed exchange rate and rising import controls. It therefore 
may be important to distinguish between devaluation as an undesirable 
component of a stabilization program and devaluation as a necessary 
part of liberalization. 
8.2  A Model of a Stabilization Program 
The standard monetary model of a stabilization program comprises 
one good, flexible wages and prices, and no imported inputs. The model 
is outlined in Branson (1983). An estimated version with considerable 
empirical detail is presented  in  Khan and Knight  (1981). The usual 
stabilization program consists of a reduction in government spending, 
devaluation, and a reduction in the rate of growth of the money supply. 
The last is generally tied to the cut in the budget deficit. As discussed 
in Branson, the devaluation can be thought of as validating the existing 
money stock as an equilibrium one. The short-run impact of the pro- 
gram comes from the cut in government spending and the devaluation. 
The longer-run effects also depend on the reduction in money growth. 
This reduction, too, could have short-run effects if  it influences infla- 
tionary expectations, but that is unlikely if the stabilization package is 
aimed at ending a long period of disequilibrium. 
In almost any model the very short-run effects of such a stabilization 
package will be stagflationary. The cut in government spending will 
tend to reduce output, and the devaluation will push up the price level. 
In  the  standard  monetary model these  effects are very  short-lived. 
Flexible real wages adjust to restore output to its full-employment level. 
The combination of reduced government spending and devaluation re- 
duces domestic absorption and eliminates the current-account deficit. 
The anti-crowding-out effect of reduced government spending actually 
stimulates investment. In the Khan-Knight model the short-run period 
of  stagflation lasts two to three years. 
Many developing countries, however,  have an economic structure 
that differs in important ways from the assumptions of  the monetary 
model. Wages and prices may not be flexible in the short run. This can 
be the result of  a Lewis-type structure in which labor is supplied to 
the modern sector at a wage, real or nominal, that is determined by 
conditions in the subsistence sector. It can also result from extensive 
government involvement in the modern  sector through  the financial 
sector or through  “parastatal”  companies. In this case wage deter- 
mination may be part of the political process, and also be a political 
problem. 
In this situation, a reduction in demand caused by the cut in gov- 
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output  due to wage or price rigidity. In  addition, many  developing 
countries import intermediate goods and capital goods as inputs into 
the production process. This means that a devaluation can raise the 
costs of  imported  inputs.  The result  can be  a  recession  and  profit 
squeeze, reducing saving and investment. Thus, the implications of the 
stabilization program for output, investment, and growth can depend 
on wage and price rigidities and the structure of trade.  I will  show 
below that the interaction of the wage-setting regime with the presence 
of imported goods can be particularly important for the success of the 
program. 
In many developing countries a useful disaggregation of output is 
into two sectors: one producing agricultural output that is traded in- 
ternationally with little domestic consumption, and the other producing 
a nonagricultural output that is at best an imperfect substitute for im- 
ports.  The nonagricultural sector uses imported intermediate inputs, 
and both sectors use imported capital goods. 
This framework allows an analysis of the effects of  a stabilization 
package on the two sectors separately, as a first approximation. In this 
section I lay out the model of the nonagricultural (N)  sector. As a first 
approximation, I assume no domestic consumption of agricultural (A) 
sector output, and so effects on its output and exports will be deter- 
mined simply by the movement of the A-sector price along its supply 
curve. The remaining subsections of this section first describe the model 
of  the N sector with explicit solutions for price, output, profits, un- 
employment, and intermediate imports. Rough parameter estimates are 
then introduced for an example based on Kenya. Finally, the numerical 
results are given under varying assumptions concerning wage deter- 
mination and the elasticity of substitution between imported interme- 
diates and value added in the N sector. 
8.2.1  A Model of the Nontraded Sector 
This subsection sets out a model for analyzing the short-run effects 
of a stabilization program in the N sector. The analytical point of the 
exercise is to see how the separate components of the program-a  cut 
in government purchases and devaluation--affect  output, the price level, 
and profits. I also want to show how the answers to this question are 
influenced by the type and degree of wage rigidity, which are to some 
extent under government control. I want to specify the model in a way 
that the parameters can be interpreted using readily available data, so 
that I can later provide the Kenyan example. 
The simplest model that meets these requirements is the following. 
The N sector produces output  Qn  using capital K, labor N, and an 
imported input I. The capital stock is fixed in the short run. The input 
is supplied elastically at the world market price P,*,  so that the domestic 
price is given by Pi  = eP;. Labor is supplied to the N sector at a wage 271  Stabilization, Stagflation, and Investment Incentives 
rate that will be specified as following a parameterized indexation sys- 
tem, so that we can study the consequences of variation in the index- 
ation parameter. Since nearly all the output of the exportable sector is 
exported, the CPI is also P,. 
An important feature of the production structure the model should 
capture is the low degree of substitutability between the domestic inputs 
K and N, and the imported input I in producing gross output  Q. To 
describe this structure as simply as possible, I assume that the pro- 
duction function is separable with a constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES)  between value added, V = F(K, N), and I, and that F is Cobb- 
Douglas. The analysis follows the line taken by Marston and Turnovsky 
(1983). The demand side will be simpler. I assume that private nominal 
demand  for output  Q, is determined by  the money  stock and  that 
government demand is exogenous. 
The Demand Side 
The focus of the analysis in this paper is the complication introduced 
into the stabilization model when aspects of supply-side structure are 
taken into account, particularly the presence of imported intermediates 
and wage indexation. Since I have nothing new to introduce on demand 
side, I will strip it down to one equation. With all of the output of the 
A sector exported, and only intermediate imports, all private final ex- 
penditure is on the N good. I assume that private sector expenditure 
for the N-sector output Q, is proportional to the money stock and that 
in  addition the government purchases N-sector output. The nominal 
demand for N-sector output can then be written as: 
P,Q,  = kM  + P,G  = E + P,G, 
where M is the money stock, E is private expenditure on Q,,, and G is 
government purchases in real terms. A demand relationship of this kind 
can be derived from the usual IS-LM analysis; it is also consistent with 
the structure of  rational expectations models. The relationship could 
also be obtained in a more general two-sector demand structure with 
consumption of both the traded export and the domestic good and with 
a unitary elasticity of substitution between the two goods in demand. 
Changes in demand are then given as: 
where a hat c)  denotes a percentage change, e.g. M = dM/M.  In equa- 
tion (1) the policy variables are  and G. Note that M is nominal and 
G is real.  If  the relevant budget  variable were nominal government 
expenditure, P,G, equation (1)  would be: 
A 
(1')  Q,  + P,, = (E/P,Q,,)A~  + (G/QJ  (P,,G). 272  William H. Branson 
The analysis will use equation (I), with the assumption that government 
purchases of N-sector output are fixed in real terms. It is easy to rework 
the results using equation (1‘).  The elasticity of the demand curve is 
the ratio Qn/Pn  = -  (1 -  G/QJ  from equation (I), with &I  = G = 0. 
This ratio is clearly less than unity in absolute value as long as G/Qn 
is positive, that is, as long as there is some government consumption 
of N-sector output. 
The Supply Side 
The prices of agricultural output Pa and imported inputs Pi will be 
taken as given, determined by the exchange rate e multiplied by the 
world price P.  Both are traded, and the country in question is assumed 
to be a “small country.” The analysis of the supply side will proceed 
as follows. First, wages are specified as partially indexed to the price 
of the nontraded good, which is also the CPI with no consumption of 
the export and all imports being intermediate goods. Next will come 
discussion of  the production function and first-order  conditions for 
profit maximization in the N sector. From these are derived the de- 
mands for labor and intermediates as functions of  relative price changes. 
Then the supply curve of output Q,, as a function of relative prices can 
be obtained. This will then be combined with the demand side to obtain 
solutions for Qn  and Pn as functions of  Pi, representing exchange rate 
changes, and G, representing the government budget component of the 
stabilization program. 
The nominal wage in the N sector is assumed to be partially indexed 
to the CPI, which is P,,, such that: 
(2)  w=  yP,;  O<y<l. 
Here y is the indexation parameter; y  = 0 denotes a fixed nominal 
wage; and y = 1 denotes a fixed real wage. Below I will present results 
for the range of y. 
The production function for Qn is assumed to be separable in value 
added, V, and intermediate inputs, I. I follow Marston and Turnovsky 
in assuming that value added is a Cobb-Douglas function of capital and 
labor inputs and that gross output in  the N sector is a CES function 
of value added and intermediate inputs, such that: 
(3) 
(4) 
v = K1-0,  ~e. 
Qn = [bl-p + (1 -  b)V-p]-”p. 
In the second-stage CES function, the elasticity of substitution between 
I  and V is given by u =  1/(1  + p).  To represent low substitutability 
between domestic factors and imported intermediates, I assume that 
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0.2 and for the limiting case of u = 0. The 0.2 estimate is based on 
the previous work of Bruno and Sachs (1979). 
In the neighborhood of an initial equilibrium, with the capital stock 
fixed in the short run, percentage changes in  V and Q, can be given 
by the following linear approximations: 
(5)  V = e,A 
(6)  Q,  = eil + e,Q = eii + eve,&. 
Here 8,  is the share of employment in value added, and Oi and 8,  are 
the shares of intermediate inputs and value added, respectively, in gross 
output. The profit function IT  is given by: 
(7)  7~ = P,Q, - WN -  P;Z. 
Producers are assumed to choose N and Z to maximize IT, given K. 
The first-order conditions for profit maximization can be written as: 
(9) 
1  Pi  -  P, = -($,  - i, 
U 
1  1" 
W-P,=-Q,- 
U 
The indexation equation (2) can be used to eliminate W from equation 
(9).  Then (8), (9), and the production relation (6) can be solved to obtain 
the supply equation for $,: 
This is the equivalent of  equation (6) in the Aizenman-Frenkel paper 
in this volume. From (6), (8), and (9) we can also obtain the reduced- 
form equations for land A. Alternatively, once we obtain $,  from (lo), 
we can solve recursively for f and 8 in (8) and (9). If indexation is 
complete, so that y  =  1, the supply equation (10) is homogeneous. 
Since the coefficient of P,  is positive, an increase in P, increases Q,; 
this is the slope of the supply curve. An increase in Pi  reduces Q, by 
squeezing value added and profits. This represents a shift of the supply 
curve. 
The parameters of  the supply equation (10) can be interpreted  as 
output  elasticities  with respect  to relative  price changes.  Using the 274  William H. Branson 
notation  that  s,  = Q,/P, with Pi equal to zero,  and so on, we  can 
rewrite equation (10) in the form: 
(1 1) 
where the s  output elasticities are given by the parameter combinations 
from equation (lo), with s,  positive and si  negative.  With equations 
(11) for N-sector supply and (1) for demand, we can now proceed to 
obtain explicit solutions for changes in Q, and P,  as functions of the 
exogenous prices Pi and Pa. 
Q,  = s,P,  + SiPi, 
Explicit Solutions for Price and Output in the N Sector 
The demand and supply equations are shown in figure 8.1. The slope 
of the demand curve from equation (1)  is given by -  1/(1  - G/Qn), 
which is greater than unity. This means that the demand curve for the 
entire competitive industry is inelastic. An upward or leftward shift of 
the industry supply curve will therefore raise the value of output in the 
industry. As we will see in detail in section 8.2.2, this opens the potential 
for ambiguity in the response of  profits to supply disturbances.  The 
share coefficients of  and G in equation  (1)  give measures of the 
horizontal shift of the demand curve when M or G changes. 
The slope of the supply curve, from equations (10) and (1  1) is given 
by P,/Q, = l/s,. Since 0,  and y are both less than unity, this slope is 
positive. An increase in the indexation parameter y increases the slope, 
making the supply curve steeper. The si  coefficient in equations (10) 
and (11) gives the horizontal shift of  the curve as Pi changes. An in- 
IlnP, 
Fig. 8.1 
1  RnQ, 
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crease in the elasticity of  substitution, cr, increases the coefficient of 
Pi, yielding an increase in the supply shift when Pi increases. 
This result, combined  with  the inelasticity  of  the demand  curve, 
means that as the indexation  parameter  y increases, the rise in  the 
value of final output following a devaluation, which increases Pi, also 
itself increases. This is the source of the result, described below in 
section 8.2.2, that an increase in  y reduces the squeeze on nominal 
profits that follows from a devaluation with imported intermediates. 
Let us now proceed to the solutions for changes in price and output. 
Equations (1) and (1  1) can be combined in matrix form, such that: 
The solution is: 
The determinant ICI  = 
P, can be written as: 
1 - G/Qn  + s,  > 0. The solutions for Q,, and 
(13)  Q  =  [(I  - 2)  siPi  + S,  (m  M + GG)]  Icl  Qn 
M+-G.  P  = -  -sipi + - 
PI [  P,Q,  Qn  "1 
From these solutions and the assumed exogenous changes in prices 
and government purchases, we can calculate the effects on the rest of 
the variables in the model. Equation (8) gives f. It also gives the per- 
centage change in imports in foreign exchange terms, since the world 
price is exogenous. Equation (9) gives the change in employment A. 
The change in the wage rate comes from the wage equation (2). The 
change in profits can then be computed as a residual, since we already 
have solutions for the change in output, P, + Q,,  in the wage bill, 
+  W, and in the bill for imported  intermediates, Pi  + f. Profits, P, 
can be computed from the identity: 
(15)  P  P,Q, - WN -  P,I. 
Percentage changes in P are given by: 
PnQn  WN  P .I 
(16)  6  = -(Pn  + 0,) - -  (@ + rir> -  (Pi + i>. 
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The underlying share data of 0.3,0.3,0.4  for inputs, profits, and labor, 
respectively, make the profit equation in the Kenya example: 
(17)  .Fi  = 3.33(Pn  + en)  - 1.33(@  + fi - l.O(Pi + 4. 
The powerful effect of an increase in P,Q,  along an inelastic industry 
demand curve can be seen in the first term on the right-hand side of 
equation (17). 
Finally, the effects on the trade balance can be computed as follows. 
The percentage change in intermediate imports is given by 1; the arith- 
metic change is therefore dZ  = h.  The percentage change in exports 
of the A sector is given by X = sapor  where s,  is the elasticity of supply 
in the A sector. Thus, the arithmetic change in exports is dX = saPz. 
The change in the trade balance, B, in foreign exchange terms is then 
simply: 
dB = s,P,X  -  iZ. 
It will be convenient to state the change as a fraction of the initial level 
of exports, such that: 
(18)  dBIX,  = sapa -  (Z/X@. 
In 1981 Z/X in Kenya was about 2.0,  as shown in table 8.1 below. 
8.2.2  Illustrative Results Using Estimates of Kenyan Data 
In this section I will present illustrative estimates of  data from the 
Kenyan economy. These are meant to give an impression of the quan- 
titive magnitude of the stagflation that follows a stabilization program, 
and the sensitivity of that stagflation to the presence of  imported in- 
termediates and to the degree of wage indexation. Here I will  show 
effects per unit devaluation or change in government spending. In sec- 
tion 8.3 I will compare these results to those for an equal change in 
the trade balance. 
The stabilization program is assumed in the short run to include a 
reduction in government spending and a devaluation. The spending cut 
is a negative G in equations  (13) and (14). Under the small-country 
assumptions, the devaluation raises both Pi  and Pa by the proportion 
of  the devaluation. As is apparent from equations (12)  through (14), 
the effects of the components of the program are additive. I will there- 
fore present  the  multipliers of  each component-the  coefficients in 
equations (13)  and (14)-separately  and then in various combinations 
to analyze the results. 
The analysis will proceed as follows. First, table 8.1 presents the 
underlying data for the Kenyan economy. These are then combined to 
give the output response elasticities s,  and si  and the system deter- 
minant C in equations (12)  through (14)  for the range of y from 0 to 1 
and for the alternative values of the elasticity of substitution of 0 and 277  Stabilization, Stagflation, and Investment Incentives 
0.2. This will represent the full range of wage stickiness from nominal 
rigidity to real rigidity, as well as a realistic range of substitutability 
between value added and imported intermediates. The effects for the 
dependent variables are then given in tables 8.3a and 8.3b. 
The Kenyan Data and the Parameters 
The relevant data from the Kenyan economy are assembled in table 
8.1. The data are from the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). N-sector output is the gross domestic product (GDP) at 
factor cost less output in the traditional, agricultural, and fishing and 
forestry sectors.  Government  expenditure  on  N-sector output G  is 
taken to be general government consumption plus capital expenditures. 
This overstates G because of the consumption of agricultural sector 
output and the import of capital goods. The result is a seemingly high 
G/Q estimate of 0.6. Since the slope of the demand curve is given by 
PJQ, = 1/(1  - G/Q),  the result is an exaggeration of the inelasticity 
of  the demand curve. 
The only quantitatively significant nonagricultural export of Kenya 
is petroleum products, which account for about  30  percent  of  total 
exports. Petroleum product exports are also about 40  percent of  all 
Table 8.1  Parameter Estimates for Kenya 









1981 general government 




forestry and fishing (Kf 
millions) 
GDP at factor cost less 
Imports less reexports of 
petroleum products 
(billion 1981 SDRs) 
petroleum products 
(billion 1981 SDRs) 
Exports less reexports of 
Share of labor in value 
added in N sector 
Share of imported inputs in 
total output in N sector 
Elasticity of agricultural 
output with respect to its 
own price Pa 
952.7  Standard Tables, 1, 5.1 
1,613.6  Standard Tables, 2.1 
0.6 
1.5  IMF 
0.7  IMF 
2.0 
0.57  Ahamed (1983) 
0.3  Ahamed (1983) 
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mineral  fuel  imports,  with  the  rest  of  the  imports  being  used  in 
domestic production.  To  make the data aggregation consistent  with 
the assumptions of the model, I subtract the reexport of petroleum 
products from both imports and exports to obtain the trade data in 
table 8.1. In doing so, I implicitly assume that the processing industry 
is not  significantly affected by  the stabilization program  considered 
here. 
The underlying shares of labor, capital, and imported inputs in gross 
output in the N sector are approximately 0.4,0.3, and 0.3, respectively 
(see Ahamed 1983 and the references therein). The labor share of value 
added, 0,,  is therefore 0.4/0.7 = 0.57. The elasticity of export supply 
is estimated to be approximately 0.1 in Ahamed. 
The data in table 8.1 can be combined to give the parameter estimates 
in tables 8.2a and 8.2b under the range of assumptions for y and u.  As 
the indexation parameter y increases, the supply curve becomes steeper 
and s,  decreases.  The output elasticity of Pi does not depend on y, 
since imported inputs do not enter the CPI directly. The determinant 
C is equal to 1 -  G/Q + s,,  so that it therefore decreases as y increases. 
An increase in u  increases s,,  flattening the supply curve. It also in- 
creases s;, the shift parameter. 
The Effects on Output, Prices, Inputs, Projits, and the Trade Balance 
The effects  of  changes in  Pi, Pa,  and  G, the components  of  the 
stabilization program, on output and the price level in the N sector and 
on the wage rate, employment, profits, and the trade balance are shown 
in table 8.3a for IT  = 0 and in table 8.3b for u = 0.2. I will henceforth 
refer to these pairs of  tables as one unit, that is, “table  8.3”  means 
Table 8.2a  Parameter Values in the N-Sector Model, u = 0 
Value of y 
Parameter  0  0.5  1 .o 
s,:  The Slope of the Supply Curve  1.89  1.23  0.57 
ICI:  The Determinant of Supply  2.30  1.64  0.98 
si:  The Output Elasticity of Pi  -0.57  -  0.57  -0.57 
Table 8.2b  Parameter Values in the N-Sector Model, u = 0.2 
Value of  y 
Parameter  0  0.5  1 .O 
S”  1.98  1.32  0.65 
ICI  2.39  1.73  0.06 
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"tables  8.3a and 8.3b."  Since the equations for Q,  and P, are linear, 
the effects of independent changes in each variable can be combined 
to study any particular combination of  disturbances. An  across-the- 
board devaluation will increase Pi  and Pa by  the same proportion; a 
spending cut will reduce  G. The numbers in table 8.3 give the per- 
centage change in each endogenous variable per percentage change in 
the exogenous variable.  For example, in the first row of table 8.3a, 
with y = 1.0 (full indexation), a 10 percent increase in Pi  would reduce 
Q, by 2.4 percent. 
The results in panel A of table 8.3 can be most easily understood by 
reference to figure 8.2. An increase in Pi  caused by a devaluation shifts 
the supply curve left. An increase in y steepens the supply curve, and the 
steeper the supply curve, the greater the effect on both P, and Q, as we 
move up the fixed demand curve. &/Pi and P,/Pi both increase with y. 
An increase in G shifts the demand curve in figure 8.2  out. The steeper 
the supply curve, the smaller the effect on Q, and the larger the effect 
on P,. Q,/G  falls and P,/G rises as y increases. An increase in cr  both 
flattens the supply curve and increases its shift with an increase in Pi. 
The result when G changes is less change in P, and more change in 
Table 8.3s  Effects on Output, Prices, and Inputs, u = 0 
Value of y 
Effects on 
Endogenous Variables  0  0.5  1 .o 
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Table 8.3b  Effects on Output, Prices, and Inputs, u = 0.2 
Effects on 
Endogenous Variables 
Value of  y 
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Fig. 8.2 
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Q,, as u increases. The net result when Pi changes is not very sensitive 
to u  in the range of 0 to 0.2. 
The effects of a devaluation only with Pi  = P,  on wages, employ- 
ment, profits, and the trade balance are shown in panel B of table 8.3. 
There we see that an increase in indexation increases the effect of  a 
devaluation on the nominal wage and on employment, as expected. An 
increase in y, however, by steepening the supply curve in figure 8.2, 
makes  the increase in  PnQn larger as long as the demand curve is 
inelastic. This means that the drop in profits is greatest with y = 0 and 
that profits actually rise with a devaluation with y  = 1  .O!  In the fourth 
row of  panel  B the CPI increase is subtracted from the percentage 
change in nominal profits. The percentage decrease in real profits is 
nearly invariant to the degree of indexation, but it falls as the elasticity 
of  substitution increases. 
The last row of  panel  B gives the effect  on the trade balance in 
foreign exchange terms. Paradoxically, this effect increases with the 
degree of wage indexation! Why? When all imports are intermediate 
goods with a low elasticity of substitution against domestic factors in 
the short run, the effect of the devaluation on imports comes mainly 
from its depressive effect on output. In the extreme case of zero sub- 
stitution there is no relative price effect. Since the reduction in output 
increases with the degree of wage indexation, so does the effect on 
intermediate inputs. This provides a striking illustration of the impor- 
tance of the role of economic structure in determining policy outcomes, 
as emphasized in Branson (1983). The basic result was already estab- 
lished in Katseli and Marion (1982). The effect of devaluation on im- 
ports in Kenya does not come through substitution among final goods 
in consumption; it comes mainly through the reduction of imported 
inputs into production. 
The effects of a cut in spending on wages, employment, profits, and 
the trade balance are shown in panel C of table 8.3  (with signs changed). 
A reduction in G reduces the wage rate more, the larger the indexation 
parameter y,  since a cut in G reduces Pi. A reduction in G results in 
a smaller loss of employment, the larger the value of y, for the same 
reason. A cut in G reduces nominal and real profits by an amount that 
is nearly invariant to the value of y or u. 
The last row of panel C shows the effects of a spending cut on the 
trade balance. Since there is no effect on the price of exports (fixed at 
P,  = eP),  there is no export supply effect. The numbers in this row 
are twice the QnlG  numbers in panel A, with signs reversed. As wage 
indexation increases, the effect on intermediate imports decreases with 
the output effect. As u increases, however, the effect of  a change in 
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8.3  Investment Incentives in a Stabilization Program 
The effects of a stabilization program (or any other exogenous dis- 
turbance) on investment can generally be analyzed in two steps. The 
first step is to determine the effect on the incentive to invest, the net 
real rate of return in the affected sector. Once the incentive effect is 
calculated, it can then be multiplied by an estimate of the elasticity of 
investment relative to that effect to determine the investment effect. 
This procedure presumably summarizes the effects on growth, at least 
within the existing economic structure and in the short run, of the given 
stabilization program. 
The elasticity of investment with respect to the net real rate of return 
must be determined empirically in individual cases. These numbers can 
be culled from existing studies and assembled into an educated guessti- 
mate, or an econometric study could be attempted if data are available. 
I focus here on the procedures for determining the effect on investment 
incentives, building on the model of section 8.2. 
The basic approach taken in  subsection 8.3.1 is to concentrate on 
the effects on Tobin's q (see Tobin 1969), the ratio of the market value 
of new capital stock to its production cost. This gives the addition made 
to the present value of the firm by a new investment, which in turn is 
an increase in the capital stock, dK. The capital stock should be an 
increasing function of q; dK = f(q),  with A1)  = 0. This is a useful 
measure partly  because it  combines the major influences on invest- 
ment-the  real productivity of capital, financial costs, and the real cost 
of production-into  one number. It also permits consideration of  dis- 
equilibria, where q #  1 for a significant length of time. In subsection 
8.3.1 I show how effects of a stabilization program on q can be cal- 
culated in terms of the multipliers of table 8.3. Then in subsection 8.3.2 
I calculate the effects on investment incentives of a devaluation versus 
a spending reduction as alternatives to achieve a given improvement 
in the trade balance. 
8.3.1  Effects on Tobin's q 
The q-ratio is defined as the ratio of the market value of an asset 
(implicit or explicit) to its production cost. If this ratio exceeds unity, 
a profit-maximizing firm will  invest. The task  here is to see how a 
stabilization program is likely to affect q in the N  sector. 
(19)  q = (RMf'dP,J, 
where R  is the real  rate of return on new investment, and r  is the 
discount factor used to convert that return into an asset value. Thus, 
Rlr is the real market value of the asset; Pk  is the cost (or price) of the 
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new investment; and P, is the output price from section 8.2. Pk/Pn is 
therefore the real cost of the asset in terms of units of  output. For a 
given value of the discount rate, r, the effect of the stabilization program 
is given by: 
(20)  4 =  -  (Pk -  P,). 
The effect on the real rate of  return, R, is given by the effects on 
real profits from panels B and C of table 8.3 divided by the existing 
capital stock K.  The expression for R is thus: 
The expression in parentheses is the effect on real profits from table 
8.3. The two terms in brackets are the multipliers from the fourth rows 
of panels B and C, respectively, in that table. These are multiplied by 
the assumed percentage devaluation, Pi, and the assumed cut in gov- 
ernment spending, G, to calculate the effect on real profits. Since the 
Pi  multiplier in table 8.3 is negative, the G multiplier is positive, Pj  is 
positive  (devaluation), and  G is  negative  (spending  cut), R  will  be 
negative in a stabilization program. 
What happens to the cost of capital goods? Let us assume that capital 
goods are both produced by  the N  sector and imported, in shares p 
and (1 - p). The percentage change in the real price of  capital goods 
is then given by: 
Pk  -  P,, = [PP, + (1 - p) Pi] -  P,, 
or 
(22)  Pk  -  P,, = (1 - p)(Pi - P,). 
Here  (1 - p) is  the  share of  imports in  capital goods supply; and 
devaluation raises its cost. Table 8.3 gives the changes in P, per unit 
change in Pi and G. These can be inserted into equation (22) to give 
the effect of a stabilization program on the cost of capital goods, such 
that: 
If (1 - P) is 0.8 and @,/Pi) is 0.37 (from table 8.3a in the case in 
which y  = 0.5), a 10 percent devaluation would increase the relative 
cost of capital goods by 5.04 percent. With PJG equal to 0.34 (in the 
same case), a 10 percent cut in government spending would raise the 
relative cost of capital goods by 2.72 percent by reducing P, for a given 
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relative price of capital goods if a significant fraction of these are im- 
ported, that is, if (1 - p) >> 0. As long as Pi > 0 and G < 0, the cost 
of capital goods in equation (23) increases. 
The expressions for R from equation (21) and (Pk - P,) from (23) 
can be substituted into equation (20) for 4 to obtain the net effect on 
investment incentives for the stabilization package. Both parts of the 
package reduce the real rate of return, R, and increase the relative cost 
of capital goods (Pk  -  P,), In the next section I compare these effects 
for a given effect on the trade balance. 
8.3.2  A Comparison of Devaluation and Spending Reduction 
The data in table 8.3 can now be used to compare the effects of a 
devaluation and a cut in spending as alternative ways to achieve a given 
improvement in the trade or current-account balance. I will compare 
the effects on employment and investment incentives and, for com- 
pleteness, the price of N-sector output as a proxy for inflation. The 
object here is to investigate the possibilities for minimizing the effects 
on employment or investment incentives of a stabilization program that 
is designed to achieve a given improvement in the external position. 
The comparison is shown in table 8.4a for u = 0 and in table 8.4b 
for u = 0.2. The first row shows the ratio of a devaluation to a spending 
cut that is aimed at achieving the same reduction in the trade deficit. 
This is the ratio of the last rows of panels C and B in table 8.3, with 
the sign changed for G. As the degree of wage indexation rises, it takes 
a bigger cut in spending to achieve a given reduction in output and in 
imports of  intermediates. This effect is reduced  as the elasticity of 
substitution increases. 
The effects of a cut in spending are shown in panel B of table 8.4. 
The first three rows repeat the data of table 8.3, showing the reductions 
in P,, Q,  and real profits per percentage-point reduction in government 
spending. The last row of panel  B gives the increase in the relative 
price of capital goods, calculated from equation (23) with  1 - p, the 
share of imports in capital supply, equal to 0.8. As the price of output 
falls, the relative price of capital goods increases. 
As the degree of wage indexation rises, the employment effect of a 
cut in spending falls and the effect on investment incentives rises. The 
latter result comes from an increasing effect on the relative price of 
capital goods with a rise in wage indexation. 
The effects of  an equivalent devaluation are shown in panel C of 
table 8.4. The first three rows are obtained by multiplying the Pi  effects 
in table 8.3 by the ratios in panel A of table 8.4.  The devaluation is 
assumed to raise both Pi and Pa.  The entries in the last row for Pk - 
P,, are calculated from equation (23), with the term for P,/Pi  taken from 
table 8.3 and the Pi multiplier taken from the ratio in panel A of table 
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Table 8.4a  A Comparison of the Effects of a Devaluation and an Equivalent 
Spending Cut, u = 0 
Value of y 
~ 
0  0.5  I .o 
A.  Ratio of  a Percentage Devaluation 
to a Percentage Cut in Spending 
for the Same Reduction in the 
Trade Deficit 
B.  Effects per Percentage Cut in G 
Price of Output, P. 
Employment, N 
Real Profits,+ - Pn 
Price of Capital, Pk -  B, 
Price of Output, Pn 
Employment, N 
Real Profits, + - in 
Price of Capital, Pk - Pn 
C.  Effects per Equivalent Devaluation 
3.23 
-  0.26 
-  0.85 





















-  0.50 
-  0.50 
0.40 
Source: Table 8.3a. 
Table 8.4b  A Comparison of the Effects of a Devaluation and an Equivalent 
Spending Cut, (I = 0.2 
Value of y 




Ratio of  a Percentage Devaluation 
to a Percentage Cut in Spending 
for the Same Reduction in the 
Trade Deficit 
Effects per Percentage Cut in G 
Price of Output, Pn 
Employment, N 
Real Profits, +r  -  P,, 
Price of Capital, Pk -  Bn 
Price of Output, P, 
Employment, N 
Real Profits, + -  P,, 
Price of Capital, Pk -  Pn 












-  0.74 












-  0.48 
-  0.48 
0.39 
Source: Table 8.3b. 
The first two rows of panel C show again the stagflationary effect of 
devaluation. The third and fourth rows show the effects on real profits 
and the relative price of capital goods. With the elasticity of substitution 
equal to zero, both effects are significantly larger than the effects of a 
spending cut for the same effect on the trade balance, except with 286  William H. Branson 
nearly complete indexation. With the elasticity of substitution equal to 
0.2, the real profits effects are about the same (-0.57  versus - 0.58) 
with y  = 0.5, but the effect on the cost of capital is much larger for 
the devaluation than for the spending cut. 
With no wage indexation, a spending reduction has a much smaller 
negative effect on investment incentives and a slightly higher effect on 
employment in the N sector than a devaluation has, and it is of course 
deflationary rather than inflationary. With high indexation the effects 
of the two alternatives on investment incentives and employment are 
about the same; the big difference is in the movement of the price level. 
These results suggest that if the source of the problem is a shock to 
the terms of trade in an essentially noninflationary initial situation, the 
best policy is a reduction in  absorption with no devaluation and no 
wage  indexation. An  absence  of  wage  indexation will be  easiest to 
maintain if the initial situation is one of price stability. It would be hard 
to sustain in the face of devaluation-induced inflation, however. Thus, 
in the situation facing Kenya in  1979-80,  the best program may well 
have been a spending reduction as needed to reduce absorption, but 
no devaluation and the maintenance of nonindexation of nominal wages. 
8.4  The Role of  Devaluation: Liberalization vs. Stabilization 
Stabilization programs generally include devaluation as part of the 
policy package. In a simple monetary model of the balance of payments, 
with only one good, the devaluation validates the existing money stock 
as an equilibrium by raising the domestic price level. Indeed, the model 
of section 8.2 shows the effect of devaluation on the price of nontraded 
output, P,. It seems unlikely that devaluation would be proposed solely 
for this purpose, however. If the only problem is a disequilibrium money 
stock, the supply of money can be reduced to restore equilibrium. 
More commonly, devaluation is proposed to eliminate, or at least to 
reduce, a current-account deficit. This benefit must be balanced against 
the concomitant depressive effect on output, profits, and investment 
in the nontraded  sector, as shown in  section 8.3.  The results there 
suggest that devaluation may not be an appropriate component of a 
stabilization program in countries with an inelastic supply of exports 
and with intermediate imports. These include many of the developing 
countries of Africa, which still rely on one or two agricultural products 
as their principal exports. In the light of this argument, one might ask 
what is the appropriate role for devaluation in these countries. In an- 
swer to this question, it is useful to distinguish between stabilization 
and liberalization. 
A case of pure stabilization arises when a country that is roughly in 
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reduction in absorption. The terms-of-trade deterioration in 1979-80 
in  Kenya is an example.  In this case domestic absorption has to be 
reduced unless there is clear evidence that the disturbance is temporary 
and the means to finance the deficit are at hand.  If the disturbance 
appears likely to last indefinitely, for example, if  the terms-of-trade 
follow something like a random walk over time, or if financing is not 
available, spending must be reduced. But a devaluation may only import 
inflation and depress profits, with little effect on the current-account 
deficit in the short run. The problem is that absorption is too high, not 
that the country is insufficiently competitive in  trade. 
Alternatively, consider a country with a protracted  disequilibrium 
generated by budget deficits and monetary expansion. If the exchange 
rate is not allowed to move, perhaps following a crawling peg, then 
import controls and export subsidies are likely to appear to contain the 
current-account deficit. As the disequilibrium continues, the real ex- 
change rate will appreciate, and increasing stringency of controls will 
be required. In this case liberalization would be appropriate. This would 
be a package of a decontrol of imports, an elimination of export sub- 
sidies, and devaluation to restore an equilibrium real exchange rate. 
The liberalization  could be independent of  stabilization.  A  country 
could, for example, liberalize in trade and move to a crawling peg after 
the initial discrete devaluation. Liberalization programs can also pro- 
duce stagflationary results, however, as shown by Buffie (1984). But 
devaluation is an appropriate component of a liberalization package. 
Stabilization and liberalization can be combined if  the objective is 
twofold: stabilization after a protracted period of disequilibrium, and 
liberalization to rationalize production and make efficiency gains. The 
argument here, though, is that it should be clear whether the deval- 
uation is aimed at carrying out the stabilization or the liberalization 
goal. The former might not be useful, and mixing the two together can 
result  in  devaluation being included  in  a pure  stabilization  package 
where it is not needed. 
Kenya in  1980 may have been an example of a country in need of 
pure  stabilization.  The external shock was a terms-of-trade deterio- 
ration caused by a temporarily strong position after the coffee boom. 
There was no clear history of domestic inflation or overvaluation of 
the currency in real terms. The 1983  World Development Report cites 
Kenya as a country with a relatively  low degree of  trade controls. 
Because Kenya needed to reduce absorption, the devaluation may have 
been counterproductive. The case of  Tanzania may be more compli- 
cated. This is probably a situation of a country’s maintaining a long 
disequilibrium by using real exchange rate and trade controls. There 
the need for stabifization versus the need for liberalization is a basic 
choice facing policy makers. The two can be kept separate, however, 288  William H. Branson 
and devaluation should probably be considered part of a liberalization 
program, independent of the decision on stabilization. 
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Comment  Jacques R. Artus 
Branson’s paper is an important contribution to the literature on the 
design of stabilization programs. In a research area in which dogmatic 
views are so common, it is a refreshing attempt to rely on the analytical 
and empirical evidence. Moreover, it focuses on a very timely issue, 
namely, whether adjustment to a lasting deterioration in the external 
terms of trade can be achieved better through devaluation than through 
a cut in government spending. 
Although I like Branson’s basic analytical approach because it is well 
rooted in economic theory, I have serious reservations about the spe- 
cific empirical application and the policy conclusions derived from it. 
Taking first the model and the parameter estimates as given, I believe 
that Branson is going too far when he states that his results strongly 
suggest that a country with an economic structure such as the one of 
Kenya should adjust through a cut in government spending rather than 
through a devaluation. The results warrant a much more subtle con- 
clusion. If  we look at the key estimate corresponding to an elasticity 
of substitution between  value added and imported inputs (u)  of 0.2l 
and an indexation coefficient (y) of 0.5, the decline in employment is 
nearly three times larger when the adjustment is sought through a cut 
in government spending rather than through a devaluation (see table 
8.1). This is a very high price to pay to avoid the two disadvantages 
of devaluation: the increase in the price of output, and the marked rise 
in the relative price of imported capital goods. 
Furthermore, the disadvantages of  devaluation are overstated. In 
particular, the rise in the price of imported capital goods could be a 
benefit in disguise. Since the elasticity of the domestic supply of saving 
with respect to the yield on saving is probably  small, the amount of 
investment  may  be  unaffected. The effect  is instead likely to be a 
substitution of domestically produced capital goods for imported capital 
goods, through changes both in production techniques and in the struc- 
ture of  production.  There could  also be a change in the pattern of 
development toward more labor-intensive techniques of production and 
economic activities. Given the existence of a large pool of unemployed 
labor, the ultimate effect could be a significant rise in economic growth. 
In  contrast,  Branson  understates  the  disadvantages  of  a  cut  in 
government spending.  The resulting  reduction  in  economic activity 
would  likely  have  a negative  effect  on private  investment.  Entre- 
preneurs  do not  add  to their  capital stock  when  a large part  of  it 
is  idle.  Moreover,  a  cut  in  government  spending  would  probably 
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mean a decline in public  investment  and  social expenditures.  Ulti- 
mately, there is no doubt that in Branson’s model the  “size of  the 
pie”  is  smaller with  the cut in government spending than with the 
devaluation,  since  output  is  less  and  the  current-account  balance 
remains unchanged.  Unless it leads to lower investment, the cut in 
government spending could imply a much lower private consumption 
than the devaluation would.  Thus, it  is not  obvious that the cut in 
government  spending  would  be  more  socially  and  politically  ac- 
ceptable than  the devaluation. 
Even more  important,  I believe  that  some of  the specific values 
assigned to key parameters of the model should be modified. Once this 
is done, the model would lead to the conclusion that devaluation is 
clearly the better policy. In particular, the value of 0.1 assigned to the 
supply elasticity of exports with respect to their own price (SJ,  is much 
too low.* There is considerable empirical evidence on the agricultural 
response to prices in Sub-Saharan African countries. Most studies find 
that the supply elasticity for the cash crops exported by those countries 
are in the ranges 0.3 to 0.5 in the first year and 0.5 to 1.5 after three 
to five years.3 Of course, the response will be influenced by the initial 
situation and the overall policy strategy of the authorities; the response 
will tend to be relatively small if  the initial price is already sufficient 
to ensure that the plantations will be well  maintained and well har- 
vested, or if  there is a severe shortage of  credit, fertilizer, and other 
inputs. This was not the case in Kenya in  1980. Moreover, Kenya’s 
exports of manufactures account for about 20 percent of its total nonoil 
exports.  The  supply  elasticity  for  those  manufactures  is  probably 
~izable.~ 
It is also likely that the value Branson assigns to the elasticity of 
substitution between value added and imported inputs in the nontraded 
sector (a)  is too low. He indicates that the 0.2 estimate is based on the 
work of  Bruno and Sachs. The problem is that the estimate of Bruno 
and Sachs referred to the substitution between value added and inter- 
mediate inputs in industrial countries. Basically, those authors were 
looking at the effect of changes in the prices of fuels and raw materials 
on their uses in production. This price effect tends to be small because 
it  is  difficult to substitute  labor and  capital for either fuels  or raw 
materials, say, in the production of steel. The issue is quite different 
in Kenya.  A  large part  of  the imported inputs used  in  the Kenyan 
nontraded sector is accounted for by semifinished products. A change 
in the exchange rate can affect the demand for these products even if 
there is no change in the techniques of production. First, some products 
may be manufactured in Kenya rather than imported. Second, some 
of the relatively few specific sectors that import much of the semifin- 291  Stabilization, Stagflation, and Investment Incentives 
ished products and contribute little domestic value added may have to 
scale down their production. 
The use of more realistic values for the supply elasticity of exports 
(s,)  and the elasticity of  substitution between domestic value added 
and imported inputs (a)  would be enough to tilt the scale in favor of 
devaluation in Branson’s model. The results appear to be particularly 
sensitive to the value of the u  parameter. For example, in the central 
case in which y = 0.5, the increase in the value of u  from zero to 0.2 
reduces by half the negative effects of devaluation on employment and 
real profit (see table 8.1). In contrast, the unfavorable effects of the 
cut  in  government spending  are not  reduced  when  the  value  of  u 
increases. 
Although devaluation would emerge as the better policy in Branson’s 
model once more realistic values were chosen for the important pa- 
rameters, it is easy to conceive of an extended model in  which this 
might not be true. A cut in spending could be a good alternative if it 
were limited to categories of  expenditures that have a relatively high 
import content and a relatively low marginal utility. It could also be a 
good alternative if the model were extended to include other countries 
exporting the same primary commodities. If all those countries shared 
the same external adjustment problem, devaluation by all of them could 
lead to a deterioration in their terms of trade. 
Finally, and on a different level, the situation of Kenya in 1980 was 
far more complex than Branson indicates. In particular, import controls 
were extremely pervasive. Indeed, the 1983 World Development Report 
cited by Branson classifies Kenya as one of the developing countries 
with the highest degrees of protection of domestic manufacturing (see 
p. 62 of that rep~rt).~  Moreover, by  1980 budget deficits and monetary 
expansion had been a problem for several years. Monetary expansion 
(broad money) averaged 23 percent per annum over the years, 1975- 
79, during which time the inflation rate averaged 14 percent per annum. 
Since the exchange rate had not been allowed to move, the international 
competitiveness of Kenya had deteriorated substantially. These con- 
siderations largely explain why Kenya did choose to devalue in  1981. 
Nonetheless, this observation should be viewed as an aside. Branson’s 
paper is mainly concerned with the case for devaluation when a country 
with the economic structure of Kenya is experiencing a lasting decline 
in its terms of trade, rather than the specific policy options of Kenya 
in 1980. With respect to this broad analytical issue, Branson’s analytical 
framework is moving us in the right direction. But more work, espe- 
cially on the empirical side, has to be done. At the present state of 
knowledge on the subject, Branson’s policy conclusions are thus rather 
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Notes 
1.  Branson indicates that he took the estimate u = 0.2 from Bruno and Sachs (1979). 
Since this is a point estimate, it is unclear why he presents stimulations for u = 0.2 and 
u = 0 and speaks of a range from 0.2 to 0. The range should extend on both sides of 
the 0.2 estimate. 
2.  Branson refers to this elasticity as the “elasticity of agricultural output with respect 
to its own price” because of his assumption that all agricultural output is exported and 
nothing else is exported. 
3. See, for example, Marion E.  Bond, “Agricultural responses to prices in Sub-Saharan 
African countries,” International Monetury Fund  StuffPupers 30, no. 4 (December 1983). 
4. Logically, one should  consider exports of  both  goods and services rather  than 
exports of goods only. International tourism, for example, is an important source of 
foreign exchange for Kenya, and there is little doubt that it is influenced by exchange 
rates. 
5. The report classified Kenya as a country with a relatively low overall degree of 
price distortion mainly because Kenya did not have major price distortions in agriculture 
or in the energy sector. 
Comment  Ravi Gulhati 
The main conclusions of the Branson paper are as follows. First, in 
1979-80  Kenya experienced an external shock, a deterioration in its 
terms of trade. Internally, the situation was “roughly in internal equi- 
librium.” Second, the appropriate policy response by the Kenyan gov- 
ernment would have been to reduce absorption and not to devalue. 
Third, the Kenyan case is typical of many African countries, which 
rely on few primary exports whose supply tends to be inelastic. Those 
countries also use imported intermediate goods that constitute a large 
share of their total imports. In all those African countries devaluation 
is the wrong policy. Finally, by contrast, the Tanzanian case was char- 
acterized by a long disequilibrium accompanied by a proliferation of 
monetary controls. Branson advocates instead the use of  devaluation 
when reforms are aimed at liberalization. 
My  own assessment of  Kenya in  1979-80  is quite different from 
Branson’s. The country faced a major structural adjustment problem 
at that time, and the deterioration in the terms of trade was merely 
aggravating the situation. That structural problem was reflected in  a 
number of more specific problems. First, the rate of growth of agri- 
cultural production had slowed down because of the exhaustion of land 
with  high  agricultural  potential; the lack  of  technological  programs 
suitable for the cultivation of arid and semiarid areas; an overvaluation 
of the Kenyan shilling and a policy of  protection against imports of 
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manufactures produced in the domestic economy, which made the in- 
ternal terms of trade disadvantageous for agriculture; and the adverse 
effects  of  government intervention in  the  pricing and  marketing  of 
several agricultural goods. Second, the growth of manufacturing pro- 
duction had also decelerated because of  a reduction in the growth of 
the internal  market and a breakdown of  the  East African Common 
Market. Third, an acceleration in the population growth rate was ex- 
erting pressure  on  arable land, accentuating already serious under- 
employment  and adding to budgetary problems  by  expanding fiscal 
outlays for education and other government services. 
In those circumstances the economic policy recommended by Bran- 
son, which would merely have reduced effective demand in order to 
adjust to the deterioration in the terms of trade, would have been grossly 
insufficient. What was required  was a policy package that combined 
reduced  outlays, devaluation,  trade  liberalization, improved budget 
controls, and measures to reduce fertility. 
To  assess the role of exchange rate policies in securing economic 
recovery in Africa, we need an analytical framework that addresses 
not only short-term stabilization issues, but also questions bearing on 
diversification in the commodity and market structure of exports; re- 
duction in the import component of consumption, production, and in- 
vestment without violating the canons of dynamic comparative advan- 
tage; and mobilization of domestic savings and external resources. The 
Branson model does not provide such a framework. The author’s po- 
sition is instead characterized by a great deal of unnecessary pessimism 
regarding the response of export production and import requirements 
to price adjustments. Elsewhere I have argued that although structural 
rigidities are present in many African countries, there are no grounds 
for unqualified pessimism about elasticity (Gulhati, Bose, and Atukor- 
ala 1985). But it is true that the short-run response is unlikely to be 
large unless excess capacity exists and can be activated quickly. What 
is essential in most African countries is a set of policies (of which the 
exchange rate is a critical part) that will bring about diversification in 
the structure of production and corresponding changes in the supply 
of tradables-both  exports and import substitutes. 
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